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In today’s environment of evolving adversarial threats, advancing technology, 
continuing budgetary pressures, and changing security concerns, acquisition leaders must 
make more informed management decisions to deliver needed capabilities to the 
warfighter. The increasing complexity, cost, and sophistication of defense systems warrant 
a greater need for the most accurate schedule estimations (Schwartz, 2014). Accurately 
predicting a schedule is challenging, but it provides commanders and decision-makers with 
a more realistic expectation of when a capability to support warfighter needs will be 
delivered. Our study seeks to identify factors that affect timeline from solicitation1 release 
to contract award for sole-source acquisitions2 greater than $500 million; understand the 
effect—both sign and magnitude—of these factors on the timeline; and create a forecasting 
model that predicts the timeline for similar contract actions. The forecasting model uses 
Air Force Life Cycle Management Contracting Directorate’s (AFLCMC/PK) historical 
contract data to estimate each explanatory variable’s effect on the timeline for a subset of 
the acquisition3 life cycle, the contract award process. The contract award process begins 
at solicitation, or request for proposal (RFP), release and ends at contract award. We refer 
to the number of days that the contract award process takes as procurement administrative 
lead time (PALT). As it currently stands, no previous research for the Air Force predicts 
the PALT for sole-source acquisitions greater than $500 million; therefore, this study is the 
first attempt to create such a model.  
A. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
AFLCMC/PK created a standard PALT for sole-source acquisitions between $50 
and $500 million using historical PALT data. AFLCMC/PK has not created this same 
timeline, or examined the contextual factors, for sole-source acquisitions greater than $500 
million. We examined factors that may affect PALT based on literature, subject matter 
                                                 
 1 Defined in Appendix.  
 2 Defined in Appendix.  
 3 Defined in Appendix.  
2 
expertise, and experience. By understanding factors that significantly drive PALT, 
AFLCMC/PK can forecast the PALT of sole-source acquisitions more accurately; find 
ways to expedite the PALT by improving significant factors; allocate manpower and 
resources more efficiently and effectively in the contract award process; decrease the 
procurement lead time; and ultimately, deliver capabilities to the warfighter in a timelier 
manner. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The questions guiding this research are as follows: What are the primary contextual 
factors that influence the PALT (i.e., the number of days from the date that the contracting 
officer4 [CO] releases the solicitation, or RFP, to the date that the CO awards the resulting 
contract5), and what are these factors’ effects—sign and magnitude—for sole-source 
acquisitions greater than $500 million? 
C. RESEARCH SCOPE  
The scope of this research is limited to predicting the PALT for a sole-source 
acquisition greater than $500 million. This scope specifically eliminates consideration of 
all schedule factors associated with procurement planning and solicitation planning prior 
to the solicitation and contract administration and contract close out after contract award.6 
D. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
The Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations7 
identified a system that is time-sensitive as one of five essential features of the future 
acquisition system in their Volume 1 Report (Department of Defense [DoD], 2018). The 
                                                 
 4 Defined in Appendix.  
 5 Defined in Appendix.  
6 Six phases of contract management include procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, 
source selection, contract administration, and contract close out (R. Rendon, email to authors, November 6, 
2018). 
7 The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (FY2016 NDAA) required the secretary of 
defense to establish a panel charged with reviewing regulations and creating ways of “streamlining and 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the defense acquisition process and maintaining defense 
technology advantage” (FY2016 NDAA, 2015).  
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report states that a culture that prioritizes processes over the mission and a system that fails 
to promote quantifying opportunity and manpower costs are two problems that lengthen 
acquisitions. These problems hinder the current system from being time-sensitive. The 
Section 809 Panel (2018) specifically identifies legislation directing the DoD to study 
PALT as “evidence of the desire for the DoD to account for delays at many process points” 
(p. 10). There are several benefits to understanding underlying factors affecting and 
accurately predicting the PALT for sole-source acquisitions above $500 million.  
Understanding the number of days that the contract award process takes can 
improve AFLCMC/PK planning. AFLCMC/PK can optimize resources by allocating labor 
more efficiently and reducing the number of manpower hours spent on each contract action. 
Strategic resource allocation adds capacity through organizational optimization and 
provides more value for U.S. taxpayer dollars because the workforce can perform other 
tasks. Accurately predicting the PALT also creates a benchmark to measure, and 
subsequently improve, performance. By understanding the factors affecting PALT, 
AFLCMC/PK can create measures to reduce unnecessary delays in the process and 
decrease PALT. Furthermore, decreasing the PALT allows contractors to begin 
performance earlier and creates an opportunity to develop, produce, and field capabilities 
faster.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This report is divided into six chapters. Chapter I includes the introduction, purpose, 
research question, scope, and benefits.  
In Chapter II, we discuss the importance of schedule in defense acquisitions and 
summarize previous defense acquisition literature and research on factors that affect 
acquisition schedules. 
In Chapter III, we explain the methodology we used to conduct our research, in 
detail, so that future researchers can replicate our findings and improve our model. We 
describe the sample and our data collection procedures, explain the operationalization of 
response and explanatory variables, and specify our prediction model. 
4 
In Chapter IV, we present the results of our regression model, including the results 
of various statistical tests we conducted to ensure our model is as robust as possible. 
In Chapter V, we discuss the results and interpretations of our regression outputs in 
detail. We analyze the statistically significant and statistically nonsignificant explanatory 
variables in comparison to our initial hypotheses at the beginning of our study. We also 
explain why our results are meaningful.  
Finally, in Chapter VI, we discuss the limitations of our research, provide 
recommendations for further research, and answer our research questions.  
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we examine previous studies and literature on schedule management 
within the defense acquisition environment. First, we define schedule within defense 
acquisition and describe the PALT process. Next, we discuss the importance of defense 
acquisition schedules in recent legislation, strategy documents, and Congressional 
testimonies. Then, we discuss problems caused by inaccurate schedule estimates from 
previous research. Lastly, we discuss previously identified factors that significantly 
influence acquisition schedules and the relationship between these factors and the ones 
within our model. 
A. SCHEDULE 
As defined by the Defense Acquisition University, a schedule is 
the process [that] examines all program activities and their relationships to each 
other in terms of realistic constraints of time, funds, and people, i.e., resources. 
In program management practice, the schedule is a powerful planning, control, 
and communications tool that, when properly executed, supports time and cost 
estimates, opens communications among personnel involved in program 
activities, and establishes a commitment to program activities and costly 
element of defense acquisition procurement. (DoD, 2001, p. 1)  
Figure 1 displays the generic life-cycle model for a hardware-intensive major 
defense acquisition program (MDAP). The generic model consists of six phases, three 
milestone decisions, and four additional decisions. 
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 Hardware Intensive Program Generic Model. 
Source: DoD (2017). 
The six phases from start to finish are Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA), 
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR), Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD), Production and Deployment (P&D), Operations and Support (O&S), 
and Disposal. The seven decisions from start to finish are the Materiel Development 
Decision (MDD); Risk Reduction Decision or Milestone A (MS A); Capability 
Development Document Validation; Development RFP Release Decision; Development 
Decision or Milestone B (MS B); Low-Rate Initial Production or Limited Deployment 
Decision, called Milestone C (MS C); and Full Rate Production Decision. The MDD 
initiates the acquisition process, but MS B initiates an acquisition program unless the 
program enters the acquisition life cycle directly at MS C (Department of Defense [DoD], 
2017). The program manager (PM) must develop an acquisition program baseline (APB), 
and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must approve the APB prior to initiating a 
program.  
The APB establishes an MDAP's cost, schedule, and performance requirements and 
serves as the baseline for tracking and reporting program status during the program 
increment or life (DoD, 2017). The term program schedule refers to the approved APB 
schedule. Negative schedule deviations from the APB delay delivery and are known as 
7 
schedule overruns or schedule slips. Congress, leaders within the Executive Branch, and 
academia primarily focus on these negative program schedule deviations, rather than 
PALT, because this deviation means that the defense acquisition workforce and contractor 
delivered a capability later than planned. 
The contract award process is a subset of the acquisition life cycle. Sole-source 
acquisitions may occur at any point in the program life cycle, but the majority of sole-
source acquisitions greater than $500 million at AFLCMC occur after MS B. AFLCMC’s 
standard process for sole-source contract awards organizes the process for sole-source 
acquisitions into six high-level activities or phases:  
• Phase 1.0—Release of RFP (Letter/Formal) to Receipt of Adequate 
Proposal (Qualifying Proposal),8 
• Phase 2.0—Fact Finding and Evaluation, 
• Phase 3.0—Business Clearance,9  
• Phase 4.0—Negotiations, 
• Phase 5.0—Contract Clearance,10 and 
• Phase 6.0—Contract Award (V. Fry, personal communication, March 8, 
2018).  
Figure 2 shows a more detailed diagram of AFLCMC’s process. For the purpose of 
data collection, we defined the end of each phase as the completion of the following 
outputs:  
• Phase 1.0—Receipt of Adequate Proposal (Qualifying Proposal),  
                                                 
 8 Defined in Appendix.  
 9 Defined in Appendix.  
 10 Defined in Appendix.  
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• Phase 2.0—Preliminary Price Negotiation Memorandum,11  
• Phase 3.0—Signed Business Clearance,  
• Phase 4.0—Date of Considered Negotiated,  
• Phase 5.0—Signed Contract Clearance, and 
• Phase 6.0—Contract Award.
                                                 
 11 According to FAR 15.406-3, “The contracting officer shall document in the contract file the 
principal elements of the negotiated agreement. The documentation (e.g., price negotiation memorandum 
(PNM)) shall include the following: 
 (1) The purpose of the negotiation. 
 (2) A description of the acquisition, including appropriate identifying numbers (e.g., RFP No.). 
 (3) The name, position, and organization of each person representing the contractor and the 
Government in the negotiation. 
 (4) The current status of any contractor systems (e.g., purchasing, estimating, accounting, and 
compensation) to the extent they affected and were considered in the negotiation. 
 (5) If certified cost or pricing data were not required in the case of any price negotiation exceeding the 
certified cost or pricing data threshold, the exception used and the basis for it. 
 (6) If certified cost or pricing data were required, the extent to which the contracting officer -- 
  (i) Relied on the cost or pricing data submitted and used them in negotiating the price; 
  (ii) Recognized as inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent any certified cost or pricing data 
submitted; the action taken by the contracting officer and the contractor as a result; and the effect of the 
defective data on the price negotiated; or 
  (iii) Determined that an exception applied after the data were submitted and, therefore, considered 
not to be certified cost or pricing data (2018).” 
9 
 
Source: V. Fry, personal communication, March 8, 2018. 
 AFLCMC’s Detailed Process Flow Chart.  
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B. IMPORTANCE OF SCHEDULE IN DEFENSE ACQUISITION  
The vision of the Federal Acquisition System is to “deliver on a timely basis the 
best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and 
fulfilling public policy objectives” (FAR 1.102(a)). Defense acquisition professionals must 
continuously deliver capabilities and weapon systems to its customer, the warfighter, with 
affordability and speed to “retain overmatch—the combination of capabilities in sufficient 
scale to prevent enemy success—and to ensure that America’s sons and daughters will 
never be in a fair fight” (Trump, 2017, p. 28). According to Under Secretary Ellen Lord, 
the under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, the Department of Defense 
delivers the best weapon systems in the world; however, the countries that pose the greatest 
threat to national security surpass the speed at which it delivers those systems, eroding the 
United States’ overmatch (DoD Acquisition Reform Efforts, 2017).  
Leadership within the Legislative and Executive Branches and Department of 
Defense—the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), President Donald Trump, 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson, 
Undersecretary Ellen Lord, and combatant commanders—universally recognize and 
support the need to reform the defense acquisition system for speed, as evidenced by a 
concerted effort to address acquisition speed. The ubiquity of reform and speed in 
legislation, strategy documents, and testimonies proves the importance of schedules, both 
PALT and program schedule, to our national security and national defense.  
Recent legislation from the last three fiscal years (FY) reflects Congress’ attention 
to defense acquisition reform. The National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) for 
FY2016, FY2017, and FY2018 contain an average of 82 provisions related to acquisition 
reform, compared to an average of 47 provisions in the previous 10 NDAAs (Schwartz & 
Peters, 2018). NDAA provisions related to speed include 
• increasing the use of rapid acquisition authorities,  
• authorizing the secretary of defense to waive provisions of acquisition law 
or regulation, and  
11 
• requiring the secretary of defense to create an advisory panel to review 
defense acquisition regulations for ways to “streamlining and improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the defense acquisition process and 
maintaining defense technology advantage.” (FY2016 NDAA, 2015)  
In addition to recent legislation, strategy documents from the president of the United States 
and Secretary of Defense echo the need for defense acquisition reform. 
The Trump administration released its first National Security Strategy (NSS)12 on 
December 18, 2017, which begins by describing a new hyper-competitive and geopolitical 
operating environment. The strategic vision of the 2017 NSS responds to this increasing 
political, economic, and military competition by putting America first and focusing on four 
pillars of national interest: (1) “protect the American people, the homeland, and the 
American way of life”, (2) “promote American prosperity”, (3) “preserve peace through 
strength”, and (4) “advance American influence” (Trump, 2017, p. 4). Defense acquisitions 
fall under the third pillar. Although the United States military remains the strongest in the 
world, many defense systems cost more than expected, take longer than planned, and do 
not always deliver the full promised capability; therefore, the ability to efficiently 
modernize existing systems and procure new ones is important (Baldwin & Cook, 2015; 
Trump, 2017). The United States must improve its acquisition processes and policies to 
increase readiness and lethality in today’s dynamic security environment and, ultimately, 
preserve peace through strength. 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines Secretary Mattis’ strategic 
approach to support President Trump’s four pillars of national interest. The 2018 NDS 
emphasizes a need to reform acquisition processes and policies to promote greater 
performance and affordability. The DoD previously implemented several acquisition 
reforms to combat cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls, yet federal 
                                                 
 12 The NSS is a congressionally mandated document that communicates the current administration’s 
strategic vision to the American people, its allies and partners, and federal agencies. The 2017 NSS also 
discusses the nation’s strategic direction—challenges, goals, and objectives—to guide federal departments, 
agencies, and other governmental organizations in executing their core function while adhering to the 
direction provided.  
12 
agencies still face significant challenges in procuring and managing major defense 
acquisitions (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2018). For example, federal 
agencies still use outdated management practices, struggle to integrate and adapt to change, 
and fight bloated bureaucracies (Trump, 2017). This bureaucratic approach fosters a culture 
that minimizes risk above all else and prioritizes “exceptional performance at the expense 
of providing timely decisions, policies, and capabilities to the warfighter” (Mattis, 2018, p. 
10). The current system and approach prove to be unresponsive to warfighter needs. 
Secretary Wilson and Under Secretary Lord testified before the SASC on DoD 
acquisition reform efforts on December 7, 2017. They concurred with President Trump and 
Secretary Mattis’ concern that the pace of capability delivery threatens national security. 
Secretary Wilson (2017) stated that the Air Force must deliver capabilities faster than ever 
“to prevail against rapidly innovating adversaries” (p. 1). According to Secretary Wilson 
(2017),  
the acquisition enterprise is currently optimized for industrial-age procurement 
of large weapons systems with extensive requirement development, military 
specifications and resultant long acquisition timelines. We must shift to align 
with modern industry practices in order to get cost-effective capabilities from 
the lab to the warfighter faster. (p. 3)  
Under Secretary Lord focused on procurement lead time [PALT] in her testimony 
before the SASC, stating that reducing the time required to award contracts is a priority. 
Under Secretary Lord concluded that the DoD could reduce procurement lead time by up 
to 50% of the current timeline, which will significantly reduce costs while simultaneously 
accelerating the required time to field new capabilities (DoD Acquisition Reform Efforts, 
2017). She initiated six pilot programs to test the DoD’s contracting agility and 
demonstrate the DoD’s ability to responsibly reduce PALT, including two AFLCMC sole-
source acquisitions: C-130J retrofit kits and Japanese Global Hawk (DoD Acquisition 
Reform Efforts, 2017). Under Secretary Lord set an interim goal of 210 days for the 
procurement lead time of these six pilot programs, but would like to eventually decrease 
that procurement lead time to 180 days (DoD Acquisition Reform Efforts, 2017). 
The remarks made by our nation’s leadership within the Legislative and Executive 
Branches indicate the need for acquisition enterprise reform and highlight prioritizing 
13 
speed as a key element. These sentiments are not new, and parties interested in defense 
acquisition have emphasized faster acquisitions for decades. This emphasis and interest 
motivated subsequent studies on the problems caused by inaccurate schedule estimates and 
schedule overruns.  
A 1998 dissertation written by U.S. Air Force Major Ross McNutt discussed six 
distinct, negative impacts of weapons system schedule delay:  
• “Systems [are] not ready when needed” (p. 39). McNutt identified 17 
specific weapons systems that began development at least five years prior 
to Operation Desert Storm but were not delivered until after the war. Seven 
of these systems provide capabilities that would have met critical needs.  
• “Systems [are] not meeting current needs when fielded” (p. 41). New 
MDAPs take nearly 10 years to develop. Operational environments and 
threats constantly change, so the specific threat(s) a program was meant to 
address may no longer exist by the time the U.S. fields the system. 
• “New systems [are] fielded with dated technology” (p. 41). McNutt 
recognized that weapons systems were delivered to the field without the 
most current technologies, due to an exponential technological growth 
paired with elongated development times. We still experience exponential 
technological growth in today’s environment; therefore, the same impact of 
elongated schedule or schedule delay exists. 
• “Slow response to new or emerging threats” (p. 43). The United States 
developed the AIM-9X in response to the Soviet Archer AA-11, which the 
Soviets developed in 1985. The AIM-9X did not reach initial operational 
capability (IOC) until November of 2003 (“AIM-9X,” 2003). This long 
development time left U.S. fighter aircraft without the specific defense 
capability it needed for 18 years. 
• “Slow response to known safety problems” (p. 43). McNutt mentioned two 
systems designed to mitigate and resolve safety issues. The slow 
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development of these systems led to multiple aircraft accidents and 
collisions that were avoidable. 
• “Effects of development time on cost” (p. 44). McNutt stated that the as 
development time increases, program costs increase: ACAT I programs that 
take seven years to complete cost $1.2 billion on average, programs that 
take from seven to 14 years cost $1.8 billion on average, and programs that 
take longer than 14 years cost $3.6 billion on average. Note: RAND 
adjusted these dollar values in terms of program base-year dollars to remove 
the effects of inflation.  
McNutt (1998) also discussed the influence of the RFP’s expected or desired 
program schedule on the contractor’s proposed schedule. He stated, “A contractor’s 
primary consideration in proposing a project’s schedule is the program office’s desired 
schedule. The company’s development capabilities are given much less consideration” 
(McNutt, 1998, p. 237). In other words, contractors simply propose the government-
provided schedule back to the government to win the contract, regardless of the 
development requirements or contractor’s capabilities (McNutt, 1998). The program 
office’s interpretation of available funding, rather than development requirements or any 
other consideration, primarily affects the expected program schedule. This may cause 
schedule slips when funding constraints, development requirements, and contractor 
capabilities are not considered holistically. 
Although McNutt’s study focused on development times in weapons system 
acquisition, the six impacts of long acquisition schedules still exist, and the process begins 
with PALT. The importance of acquiring and fielding relevant, current, and reliable 
technology to the warfighter on a timely basis remains unchanged through the years. 
C. DEFENSE ACQUISITION SCHEDULE PREDICTIVE FACTORS 
In this section, we summarize and consolidate previous studies and reports on 
defense acquisition schedules so that we can better understand factors that affect schedules. 
Since this is the first attempt to develop a multiple regression model that predicts the PALT 
of a sole-source acquisition greater than $500 million, we need to understand the 
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similarities and differences between previously conducted research and our research. To 
understand the similarities and differences, the summaries of each study or report include 
the researchers’ purpose, the definition of the examined schedule, the population of interest 
and sample, the estimation procedure or analysis framework, the hypothesized factors that 
affect schedules, and the results of their research. Table 1 consolidates the sample and data, 
dependent variable(s), results, and significant independent variables of the literature 
examined in our literature review. 




1. Drezner and Smith (1990) 
Drezner and Smith (1990) listed three research objectives: determining whether 
acquisition program durations are increasing, identifying and understanding the factors that 
affect acquisition program durations, and providing recommendations to decrease 
acquisition program durations. They measured program duration from the start of 
Milestone I13 to the “delivery of the first operationally configured production article to the 
user” (Drezner & Smith, 1990, p. v).  
Drezner and Smith (1990) selected 10 systems and subsystems programs that 
started Milestone I after 1970. They wanted a diverse sample, so the programs they selected 
vary in program characteristics, acquisition strategies, schedule outcomes, schedule 
durations, and lead services. They prioritized studying a smaller sample in greater detail 
over studying a larger sample in less detail to understand the factors that affect program 
length better and measure program length more consistently. One limitation of their 
research is the selected sample size limits the applicability of their findings to their 
population.  
Drezner and Smith (1990, p. viii) created a general model to represent program 
length and frame their analysis:  
 Actual Program Length = Length of Original Plan + Deviation from Plan (1) 
Drezner and Smith (1990) identified 16 factors that potentially affect actual 
program length and categorized each factor under one of three categories: factors that 
affected the estimated length of the original plan, factors that caused deviations from the 
original plan, and factors that affected the estimate of the original plan and caused 
deviations of the original plan. The researchers hypothesized that six of the 16 factors 
affected the estimated length of the original plan, five of the 16 factors caused deviations 
from the original plan, and five of the 16 factors did both (Drezner & Smith, 1990). 
Out of the 11 factors that Drezner and Smith analyzed, they identified nine as 
significant in affecting the original plan. Competition, Prototype Phase, Joint Management, 
                                                 
 13 Defined in Appendix.  
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and Program Complexity tended to lengthen schedules; Concurrency, Funding Adequacy, 
Separate Contracting, and Service Priority tended to shorten schedules; and External 
Guidance could either lengthen or shorten the schedule depending on the actual guidance 
(Drezner & Smith, 1990). They did not find any evidence that Technical Difficulty or 
Concept Stability affected the original plan (Drezner & Smith, 1990).  
Of the 10 factors that the researchers identified as potentially causing a deviation 
from the original plan, eight caused a deviation. The eight factors were External Guidance, 
Program Complexity, Technical Difficulty, Concept Stability, Contractor Performance, 
External Event, Funding Stability, and Major Requirements Stability. Each of the eight 
factors tended to cause a schedule slip or delay the schedule. The researchers did not find 
any evidence that Joint Management or Program Manager Turnover caused a deviation to 
the original plan (Drezner & Smith, 1990). 
Our research is similar to Drezner and Smith’s second research objective: 
identifying and understanding factors that affect schedules, but our research differs because 
our primary objective is to estimate a schedule with each factor’s effect—sign and 
magnitude. They did not study the magnitude of their factors’ effects. Our schedule and 
population are also subsets of the schedule and population examined in this study. 
2. MacKinnon (1992) 
MacKinnon’s (1992) thesis objective was to develop a forecasting model that 
predicts both the cost and lead-time (PALT) of awarding a contract. He defined PALT as 
the number of days from an approved acquisition requirements package to an awarded 
contract (MacKinnon, 1992).  
MacKinnon (1992) analyzed the PALT of 834 contracts greater than $25,000 
awarded by the Naval Air Weapon Center, China Lake, California between 1989 and 1991. 
He developed an estimation model using 559 contracts awarded in 1989 and 1990 and 
validated his model using 275 contracts awarded in 1991 (1992).  
The response variable is PALT, and he transformed PALT by taking the natural 
logarithm. He identified five factors that potentially explain PALT:  
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• Contract Type: fixed price or cost-reimbursable;  
• Contract Value: in dollars and transformed by squaring the natural 
logarithm of dollar value;  
• Contract Description: service, supply, or research and development;  
• Competitive Nature: competitive or sole-source; and  
• Complexity Score in points. Complexity score is the difficulty in processing 
that individual contract action based on variables such as contract value, 
contract type, justifications and approval required, and number of RFP 
amendments (MacKinnon, 1992).  
MacKinnon (1992) fit the full model using each variable and every possible 
interaction, and then sequentially eliminated each variable that was not statistically 
significant at alpha = 0.10. The final model explained approximately 27.4% of the variation 
in PALT. MacKinnon found that a significant relationship between PALT and Contract 
Type, Contract Value, and Contract Description existed. 
3. Cashman (1995) 
The objectives of Cashman’s (1995) thesis were to identify the reasons for schedule 
problems, to quantify the frequency and severity of each identified reason, and to 
demonstrate that the identified reasons commonly exist in large Air Force system 
development programs. He used a descriptive study to research reasons for schedule 
problems. He did not focus on determining the causal relationships of schedule delays.  
Cashman (1995) researched the schedule of 22 Air Force programs—including 
aircraft, missile, aircraft equipment, aircraft upgrade, and simulator programs—in the 
EMD phase from 1981 to 1994 with contract values from $40 million to greater than $10 
billion. Cost performance reports (CPRs) provided all the data for his analysis. Contractors 
delivered CPRs to the program office monthly on major defense acquisition programs and 
CPRs contained the reasons for and severity of schedule problems. In his sample, 
contractors reported 549 instances of schedule problems (Cashman, 1995). 
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Cashman (1995) sorted the reasons for schedule problems into 20 categories; 
however, we are particularly interested in the contracting and subcontractor late categories 
from this study. He further separated the contracting category into four subcategories:  
• selecting subcontractors,  
• awarding subcontractor contracts,  
• processing purchase orders, and  
• terminating subcontractors. 
Cashman found that Contracting delayed schedule in nine of the 22 EMD programs.  
Cashman (1995) separated the subcontractor late category into three subcategories: 
• late deliveries that impacted the prime contractor’s activities,  
• late deliveries by lower-tier subcontractors (a subcontractor’s 
subcontractor) that impacted a subcontractor’s activities, and  
• slow progress by a subcontractor that prevented the subcontractor from 
meeting its planned schedule.  
Subcontractor late delayed schedule in 17 of the 22 EMD programs (Cashman, 1995). 
Cashman (1995) compared the 20 categories in three dimensions to quantify the 
importance of each category in terms of frequency and severity—frequency, total schedule 
variance ($), and total schedule variance (workdays)—to meet the study’s second 
objective. Contracting ranked number five and four in both severity categories, total 
schedule variance ($) and total schedule variance (work days) respectively Subcontractor 
late ranked number two in frequency, two in total schedule variance ($), and one in total 
schedule variance (work days) respectively. The top three factors in terms of frequency 
were Technical Problems, Subcontractor Late, and Late Data. The top three factors in terms 
of dollar variance were Technical Problems, Subcontractor Late, and Design Changes. 
Lastly, the top three factors in terms of workdays were Subcontractor Late, Manufacturing 
Problems, and Technical Problems (Cashman, 1995). 
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4. McNutt (1998) 
The initial research questions from McNutt’s (1998) dissertation were as follows: 
How are schedules determined? How does the initial schedule impact the development of 
the contractor’s schedule and subsequently, the contracted schedule? And how does the 
initial and contracted schedule impact the actual development schedule? 
McNutt conducted an exploratory, survey-based research study utilizing three 
different surveys to answer these questions. He sent the surveys to 905 potential respondents, 
and these respondents “were identified as the Program Offices, the defense contractors, and 
the Pentagon” (McNutt, 1998, p. 144). McNutt (1998) received 317 responses across ACAT 
I, II, and III programs showing a sufficient representation of aerospace development efforts 
initiated from 1970 to 1998. The cost of these efforts ranged between $140 million to $2.1 
billion in their respective year’s dollar values (McNutt, 1998).  
McNutt (1998) used a variety of methods to analyze the data collected from the 
surveys with the goal of identifying the factors and their influence on program schedules. 
He discussed the visual inspection of the distribution of the raw data, which showed that 
more times than not the data did not fall on a normal distribution curve; this finding limited 
the amount of statistical analysis that could be conducted on the data. Therefore, McNutt 
conducted a variety of statistical tests on the data that did not rely on the assumption of 
normally distributed data, such as the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, which analyzed and 
presented the interval scale data (McNutt, 1998). McNutt established statistical groupings 
for the different variables into four parts: development of a program’s initial schedule, 
effects of the initial schedule on the contracting phase, schedule-related incentives from all 
stakeholders, and the effects of a program’s initial schedule and the contracted schedule on 
the development schedule (McNutt, 1998). For the purposes of this study, we only focused 
on the first two categories of his findings as they relate more closely to our research. 
McNutt (1998) found that the initial schedule is driven mostly by “funding-related 
constraints” (p. 218). The initial schedule development is primarily influenced by the user’s 
desired delivery schedule, the expected development funding, and the expected production 
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funding. Furthermore, expert judgment is used to consider the other constraints in the initial 
schedule development (McNutt, 1998).  
As discussed previously in this chapter, McNutt (1998) found that the contracted 
schedule was primarily driven by the initial schedule developed and presented to contractors. 
This, based on McNutt’s (1998) assessment, was driven by the lack of incentives given to 
the contractor to deviate from the government-provided schedule. These findings may 
suggest that negotiations surrounding schedule would not be a significant driver for PALT 
because the deviation between the contractor’s proposal and the government’s initial 
schedule are, according to McNutt, exceedingly similar across the data. 
5. Monaco and White (2005) 
Monaco and White’s report (2005) provided an overview of factors that cause 
schedule variances from previous descriptive and inferential statistical studies. They 
reviewed 12 studies conducted from 1987 to 2002 and highlighted common factors that 
affect schedule. The most common predictive schedule drivers in acquisition literature 
were technical issues, such as technical maturity, technical difficulty, and technical 
complexity; competition; prototyping; and contract type. 
In addition to the study conducted by Monaco and White, in 2011, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study on space acquisitions to investigate 
continuing cost and schedule growth. While our population excludes space acquisitions, 
these large system acquisitions are of comparable scope and magnitude to the programs 
analyzed by our team. The GAO (2011b) assessed the billions of dollars in cost growth, 
schedule slippage, and increased technical risk. The GAO (2011b) report mentioned that a 
nine-year schedule slip left the military open for capability gaps and increased costs. The 
GAO (2011b) stated that the DoD had a longstanding tendency to begin space programs 
prior to maturing technologies to the required technology readiness level. Reaching an 
appropriate technology readiness level prior to program initiation reduces cost, schedule, 
and performance risks. 
Furthermore, the GAO’s 2017 annual defense major weapons system acquisition 
assessment discussed the current trends in the DoD across 78 programs. The report 
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discussed the adverse effects on cost and schedule that carried through to subsequent 
phases of the acquisition when systems started without fully mature technologies (GAO, 
2017). The GAO (2017) discussed the process of “fully maturing technologies prior to 
system development start” (p. 1) as an enterprise best practice that should be incorporated 
into future acquisitions. Technology maturation, technology risk, and technology readiness 
are all factors that repeat throughout reports and acquisition literature. 
6. Riposo, McKernan, and Duran (2014) 
Riposo, McKernan, and Duran’s report (2014) summarized the sources of excessive 
cycle-time and schedule growth from defense acquisition literature and presented possible 
opportunities to shorten individual program schedules. The researchers’ purpose, however, 
was not to critically analyze the validity of the findings in acquisition literature. The 
researchers studied literature from government, academia, and non-profit analytic sources to 
understand the cause of schedule growth and increased cycle-times and ways to address it.  
Riposo et al. (2014) identified three main reasons for schedule growth: difficulty of 
managing technical risk, difficulty of fulfilling initial assumptions or expectations, and 
funding instability. The researchers explained that schedule growth frequently stemmed 
from managing technical risk in areas such as “program complexity, immature technology, 
[and] unanticipated technical issues" (Riposo et al., 2014, p. 18). They suggested “using 
incremental fielding and evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategies, developing derivative 
products, and using mature or proven technology” to manage or reduce technical risk 
(Riposo et al., 2014, p. xii).  
Riposo et al. (2014) found that the difficulty of fulfilling initial assumptions or 
expectations such as schedule estimates, risk control, system requirements, and 
performance assumptions led to schedule growth. Ambitious and overly optimistic were 
two characterizations associated with schedule growth, and the researchers stated that 
ambitious schedules “blind[ed] decision-makers to the need to make early, informed trade-
offs, and they set up programs for later criticism over schedule growth” (Riposo et al., 
2014, p. 59). They recommended using improved schedule estimates but claimed that 
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schedule-estimating methodologies are not well developed and the extent of schedule-
estimating skills is limited (Riposo et al., 2014). 
Riposo et al. (2014) also described how funding instability led to schedule growth. 
Fiscal constraints and stagnant, or even decreasing, budgets force programs to compete for 
funding, which leads to funding instability and ultimately, schedule growth. In 2010, 
former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD 
AT&L) Ashton Carter initiated Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (BBP 1.0). In BBP 1.0, he stated that  
the leisurely 10–15 year schedule of even the simplest and least ambitious 
Department programs not only delays the delivery of needed capability to the 
warfighter, but directly affects program cost. As all programs compete for 
funding, the usual result is that a program settles into a level-of-effort times the 
length of the program. Thus, a one-year extension of a program set to complete 
in 10 years can be expected to result in 10 percent growth in cost as the team 
working on the project is kept on another year. Yet managers who run into a 
problem in program execution generally cannot easily compromise 
requirements and face an uphill battle to obtain more than their budgeted level 
of funding. The frequent result is a stretch in the schedule. (Carter, 2010, p. 4–
5)  
Riposo et al. (2014) identified overly demanding requirements at program initiation 
and requirements changes during performance as two factors that affect the schedule. 
Additionally, the GAO (2011a) expressed concerns about the complexity of changing 
requirements and cost and schedule growth:  
While changing requirements creates instability and, therefore, can adversely 
affect program outcomes, it is also possible that some programs experiencing 
poor outcomes may be decreasing program requirements in an effort to prevent 
further cost growth. … Programs with changes to performance requirements 
experienced roughly four times more growth in research and development 
costs and three to five times greater schedule delays compared to programs 
with unchanged requirements. Similarly, programs with increases to key 
system attributes—lower level, but still crucial requirements of the system—
experienced greater, albeit less pronounced, cost growth and schedule delays 
than other programs. (p. 14)  
Riposo et al. (2014) stressed that creating an appropriate or optimal schedule and 
executing that schedule require balancing various complexities and interrelated factors, 
24 
such as technological maturity, complexity, and budget. These factors stem from sources 
both internal and external to the government. Riposo et al. (2014) detailed potential ways 
to improve schedule management based on acquisition literature. Those most closely 
pertaining to this report include but are not limited to 
• Requirement generation improvements: provide "stable and realistic initial 
requirements, especially at the engineering level,” (p. xiii) improve 
collaboration between the program offices and customers, and increase 
"proper management of flexible requirements” (p. xiii); 
• Technical risk improvements: increase use of mature/demonstrated 
technology, prototype more frequently, increase concurrency in programs 
with low technical risk, employ more “agile methods that easily respond to 
changes in software development” (p. 38), increase use of commercial 
items, and reduce the complexity of designs where able; and  
• Resource allocation improvements: use stable funding and adequate test 
funds when able (Riposo et al., 2014, p. 16) 
Due to the nature of the internal and external factors present in government 
acquisition, unpredictability will always play a role in schedule growth. To the best extent 
possible, all factors should be analyzed and weighted properly when examining and 
approximating schedule growth.  
7. Jimenez (2016) 
The objective of Jimenez’s (2016) study was to develop a multiple regression 
model that predicts the schedule from the end of Milestone B (MS B), which is the 
Development Decision, to IOC, which is the point that the system is deployable and 
provides a capability to the warfighter, in months (Jimenez, 2016). 
Jimenez (2016) created a database populated with Selected Acquisition Report14 
data for 330 defense acquisition programs dating back to the 1950s. The database included 
                                                 
 14 Defined in Appendix.  
25 
defense programs from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines. Jimenez’s sample size 
included 56 programs. He excluded space programs, programs that did not have both an 
MS B and an IOC date in the database, programs that did not have RDT&E funding data 
for at least one year prior to MS B, and programs that did not have clear Milestone A15 
start and end dates and funding data (Jimenez, 2016). He randomly split the sample of 56 
programs into a validation pool of 11 programs and a regression model pool of 45 
programs. Jimenez identified 26 pre-MS B factors that potentially predict post-MS B 
schedules to include in his model and used a mixed direction stepwise regression to identify 
significantly significant factors and estimate the statistically significant factors’ effects 
(Jimenez, 2016).  
Jimenez (2016) found four statistically significant factors. The first factor is 
RDT&E Funding (in millions of dollars) at MS B Start, which is the raw total of RDT&E 
funds allocated to the program prior to MS B. The second factor is the Percentage of 
RDT&E Funding at MS B Start, which is the percentage of RDT&E funds allocated to the 
program prior to MS B. The third factor is Modification—whether the program is a 
modification to a pre-existing weapons system. The fourth factor is 1985 or later for MS B 
Start—or whether the program started MS B in 1985 or later.  
Jimenez’s (2016) model explained 42.9% of the variation in timelines. He found 
that the strongest prediction variable, at 31% contribution to the model, is the percentage 
of RDT&E funds allocated to the program prior to MS B. Similar to Jimenez, the purpose 
of our research is to develop a multiple regression model to predict schedule. Our 
population of interest and estimated schedule differ from Jimenez’s population and 
schedule because both our schedule and population are subsets of his. 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, defense acquisition schedules, especially negative deviations from 
APBs, continually draw attention from Congress, the president, secretary of defense, 
service secretaries, combatant commanders, and academia. Parties interested in defense 
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acquisitions seek to improve schedule estimations, decrease cycle-times, and deliver 
capabilities faster. Based on our literature review, we collected data on factors such as 
contract value, contract type, external events or outside influences, mission type, and 
number of subcontractors. Other factors in our study came from subject matter expertise 
and experience in contracting.  
Technological difficulties such as risk, maturation, and readiness are recurring 
factors that lengthen program schedules in acquisition literature. From literature, it is 
evident that technical readiness is not only pertinent post-award through TMRR, EMD, 
and P&D, but also important during the solicitation and contract award phases. Although 
literature frequently cites technical difficulties, risk, maturation, and readiness as factors 
affecting program schedule, we decided not to include these as factors in our specified 
model. While these technical difficulties may affect contractor performance and program 
schedules, the relationship between technical difficulties and PALT are unclear. 
Additionally, although literature states competition requirements lengthen schedules, our 
study’s scope is limited to sole-source acquisitions and excludes competitive acquisitions; 
therefore, we did not include competition requirements as a factor in our prediction model. 





The purpose of this chapter is to describe the procedures used to conduct our 
research in detail. First, we describe the population, sample data, and method of collecting 
the sample data. Second, we explain our operationalization of the response variable and 
explanatory variables. Third, we specify the preliminary model. Lastly, we provide the 
estimation procedure. 
A. POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
Our unit of analysis is AFLCMC non-competitive contract actions greater than 
$500 million at the final business clearance. We chose to include actions greater than $500 
million at business clearance, rather than at the receipt of an adequate proposal, because 
the clearance approval authority (CAA) changes at that threshold. The deputy assistant 
secretary of the Air Force for contracting (DAS[C]) or associate deputy assistant secretary 
of the Air Force for contracting (ADAS[C]) acts as the CAA for actions greater than $500 
million (Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [AFFARS] 
5301.9001(f)(1)).16 If the proposal is greater than $500 million, but the Air Force 
negotiation team’s negotiation objective is less than $500 million, the CAA is the senior 
center contracting official17 (SCCO) at the operating location (AFFARS 5301.9001(f)(2)). 
The population includes all AFLCMC non-competitive contract actions greater 
than $500 million awarded after October 1, 2013, and includes contract actions from 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) OH, Eglin AFB FL, Hanscom AFB MA, Hill 
AFB UT, and Robins AFB GA. The population includes Program Executive Officer (PEO) 
requirements for Agile Combat Support; Armament; Business and Enterprise Systems; 
Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence and Networks; Digital; Fighters and 
Bombers; Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Special Operations Forces; 
                                                 
 16 The threshold changed from $500 million to $1 billion on October 1, 2018.  
 17 Defined in Appendix.   
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Mobility; Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization; and Tankers and non-PEO requirements 
for services.  
Our team collected all the data for this analysis and created a new database. The 
sample size of our database is 26 contract actions. AFLCMC awarded all the sample 
contract actions between October 1, 2013, and February 6, 2018. We travelled to WPAFB 
to collect data from contract files for Mobility and Tanker actions from May 14 to May 18, 
2018. Additionally, our team used electronic copies of Preliminary Price Negotiation 
Memorandums (PPNM) and/or Price Negotiation Memorandums18 (PNM) to collect data 
                                                 
 18 “The contracting officer shall document in the contract file the principal elements of the negotiated 
agreement. The documentation (e.g., price negotiation memorandum (PNM)) shall include the following: 
 (1) The purpose of the negotiation. 
 (2) A description of the acquisition, including appropriate identifying numbers (e.g., RFP No.). 
 (3) The name, position, and organization of each person representing the contractor and the 
Government in the negotiation. 
 (4) The current status of any contractor systems (e.g., purchasing, estimating, accounting, and 
compensation) to the extent they affected and were considered in the negotiation. 
 (5) If certified cost or pricing data were not required in the case of any price negotiation exceeding the 
certified cost or pricing data threshold, the exception used and the basis for it. 
 (6) If certified cost or pricing data were required, the extent to which the contracting officer -- 
   (i) Relied on the cost or pricing data submitted and used them in negotiating the price; 
  (ii) Recognized as inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent any certified cost or pricing data 
submitted; the action taken by the contracting officer and the contractor as a result; and the effect of the 
defective data on the price negotiated; or 
  (iii) Determined that an exception applied after the data were submitted and, therefore, considered 
not to be certified cost or pricing data. 
 (7) A summary of the contractor’s proposal, any field pricing assistance recommendations, including 
the reasons for any pertinent variances from them, the Government’s negotiation objective, and the 
negotiated position. Where the determination of a fair and reasonable price is based on cost analysis, the 
summary shall address each major cost element. When determination of a fair and reasonable price is based 
on price analysis, the summary shall include the source and type of data used to support the determination. 
 (8) The most significant facts or considerations controlling the establishment of the prenegotiation 
objectives and the negotiated agreement including an explanation of any significant differences between the 
two positions. 
 (9) To the extent such direction has a significant effect on the action, a discussion and quantification of 
the impact of direction given by Congress, other agencies, and higher-level officials (i.e., officials who 
would not normally exercise authority during the award and review process for the instant contract action). 
 (10) The basis for the profit or fee pre-negotiation objective and the profit or fee negotiated. 
 (11) Documentation of fair and reasonable pricing” (FAR 15.406-3(a), 2018). 
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for all contract actions in the sample. We used AFLCMC/PK’s Contract Action Tracker 
for the start and end dates of each phase.19  
B. OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
This section describes the variables in our model, how we categorized or measured 
each variable, and how we transformed the variable, if applicable. 
1. Response Variable 
The dependent variable is the predicted PALT for sole-source acquisitions greater 
than $500 million, measured in days. If the contracting officer issued an undefinitized 
contract action20 (UCA), we defined the contract award as the date that the CO signed the 
contract resulting from the definitization21 of all terms and conditions. We transformed the 
response variable by taking the natural logarithm of the PALT: Ln(PALT). The logarithmic 
transformation of PALT quantifies the approximate percent change in PALT resulting from 
a change in the explanatory variables, which makes the results more meaningful and allows 
users of this model to understand the associations with the explanatory variables more 
intuitively. The logarithmic transformation also accounts for non-linear relationships 
between the explanatory variables and response variable.22  
a. Predicted Procurement Administrative Lead Time (Regression Output)—
PALT  
This variable states the predicted PALT for a sole-source acquisition greater than 
$500 million based on the model’s explanatory variables in Ln(Days). Table 2 provides the 
descriptive statistics of Ln(PALT) in our sample, and Figure 3 depicts the graph of 
Ln(PALT) for each observation. 
                                                 
 19 If the start date of a specific phase did not match the end date of the previous phase, we edited the 
start date of that specific phase to match, so that we did not miss or double count any days. 
 20 Defined in Appendix.  
 21 Defined in Appendix.  
 22 The logarithmic transformation of the response variable allows the regression model to represent a 
linear relationship between time and our predictor variables. This transformation satisfies the Ordinary 
Least Squares assumption that the regression model is linear in parameters (i.e., regression coefficients). 
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There are three contract actions for Non-PEO requirements. All three of these 
contract actions are for Federally Funded Research and Development Center23 services 
awarded to non-profit contractors. The timeline for these observations was at least 1.5 
standard deviations shorter than the mean timeline for all observations (i.e., 412 days 
shorter than the mean).24 
2. Candidate Explanatory Variables 
This section explains the candidate explanatory variables for the multiple 
regression model in terms of how we categorized, found, and/or measured each explanatory 
variable. We chose candidate explanatory variables based on inputs from subject matter 
experts and literature.  
Users of our model must input a value for each explanatory variable to estimate 
PALT. An Air Force negotiation team (AFNT) estimates PALT prior to RFP release; 
however, the AFNT will not know the value of all explanatory variables at the time of RFP 
release. Therefore, the AFNT must estimate values for explanatory variables that are 
unknown at the time of RFP release. The following sections identify the phase that the 
AFNT should know the value of each explanatory variable, if the variable value is unknown 
at RFP release.  
a. Proposed Price (Price)—Continuous Variable 
This continuous variable gives the contractor’s proposed price. We found this 
information in the contractor’s proposal, PPNM, or PNM. We transformed the proposed 
price by taking the natural logarithm: Ln(Price). The relationship between time and price 
is non-linear, so the logarithmic transformation of price allows the model to satisfy the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumption that the model is linear in parameters for price. 
The AFNT will not know this value until the contractor submits a qualifying proposal (end 
                                                 
 23 Defined in Appendix.  
 24 The mean is 6.5807, and the standard deviation is 0.5653. We calculated 412 days by taking the 
difference between the exponentiation of Euler’s number by the mean (e^6.5807) and the exponentiation of 
Euler’s number by the difference between the mean and the standard deviation multiplied by 1.5: (e^6.807) 
- (e^(6.807-1.5*(0.5653))). 
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of Phase 1.0). Based on MacKinnon’s (1992) thesis, our hypothesis is that a positive 
relationship between Price and PALT exists. 
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for Ln(Price) in our sample. 













Count 26  
 
b. Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA)—Categorical (Binary) Variable 
This categorical variable identifies whether the contracting officer issued a UCA to 
the contractor in order for the contractor to commence work immediately or if the 
contracting officer negotiated the terms and conditions prior to the contractor commencing 
work (standard buy). There are two categories:  
• yes, the action is a UCA (1); and  
• no, the action is a standard buy (0).  
The AFNT knows this variable prior to RFP release. Of the 26 observations within 
our sample, 11 are UCAs. 
We hypothesize that a positive relationship exists between UCA and PALT because 
the DoD and Air Force have experienced difficulties with meeting definitization timelines. 
The DFARS requires the CO to definitize a UCA within 180 days of issuing the UCA but 
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allows up to a 180-day extension after the receipt of a qualifying (adequate) proposal. 
Former Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) Claire Grady stated 
in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that despite the DFARS 
definitization timeline requirements, there were 11 FMS UCAs that were not definitized 
after 730 days (Assessing the DoD’s Execution of Responsibilities in the U.S. FMS 
Program, 2016). The GAO (2015) examined the Air Force’s use of UCAs and found that 
the Air Force did not meet the definitization timelines for seven of the nine UCAs reviewed 
by the GAO. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)/A9 analyzed and 
compared AFLCMC’s standard PALT of 365 days for contracts valued between $50 and 
$500 million to the PALT of contracts that AFLCMC awarded from 2009 to 2017 between 
these dollar values. AFMC/A9 found that AFLCMC awarded 154 contracts late (i.e., the 
PALT exceeded 365 days), 50 of the 154 contracts awarded late started as UCAs, and the 
PALT of 26 of these 50 contracts that started as UCAs exceeded 730 days (V. Fry, personal 
communication, May 7, 2018). 
c. Is the Date of Initial Proposal and Date of Adequate Proposal the Same 
(Adq_Prop)—Categorical (Binary) Variable 
This categorical variable identifies whether the date of the contractor’s initial 
proposal and the date of an adequate proposal are the same. There are two categories: yes 
(1) or no (0). We used AFLCMC/PK’s Contract Action Tracker for the dates of initial 
proposal and adequate proposal. The dates are the same for 15 observations and different 
for 11 observations. The AFNT will know this variable after the contracting officer reviews 
the contractor’s initial proposal (Phase 1.0). 
If the dates of the initial proposal and adequate proposal are the same, we expect 
that PALT will decrease, (i.e., a negative relationship between Adq_Prop and PALT), if 
Adq_Prop is yes (1). Phase 1.0 ends with the receipt of an adequate proposal, so any delay 
of the contractor submitting an adequate proposal delays the rest of the sole-source contract 
award process and extends the PALT. Under Secretary Lord identified the receipt of an 
adequate proposal within 60 days as one way to reduce PALT (DoD Acquisition Reform 
Efforts, 2017). The GAO’s (2015) report on the Air Force’s use of UCAs stated that Air 
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Force contracting officials assert that the lack of an adequate proposal is the most common 
cause of definitization timeline delays.  
d. Number of Proposed Major Subcontractors and Major Inter/Intra-Work 
Transfer Orders /Agreements (Major_Subs)—Continuous Variable 
This continuous variable identifies the number of major subcontractors proposed 
by the prime contractor and the number of divisions (transfers) within the corporation 
performing a major portion work for the prime contractor. We defined Major_Subs as 
subcontractors or transfers25 that exceed the threshold at FAR 15.404-3(c)(1). The current 
threshold is $13.5 million. The threshold prior to October 1, 2013, was $12.5 million.26 We 
collected this data from the contractor’s proposal, the PPNM, or PNM. The PPNM and 
PNM contain the proposed prices of subcontractors and transfers in the cost element 
summary, typically under subcontract costs or material costs. The AFNT will know this 
value after the contractor submits an adequate proposal (end of Phase 1.0). 
We expect a positive relationship between Major_Subs and PALT. Prime 
contractors request and evaluate subcontractor proposals and negotiate and award 
subcontracts. The AFNT evaluates subcontractor proposals and negotiates subcontractors 
as a cost element of the prime contractor’s proposal. As the number of subcontractors 
increases, we expect the PALT to increase.  
Table 4 and Table 5 contain the descriptive statistics and tabulation of Major_Subs. 
Of the 26 observations in the sample, 22 observations have at least one major subcontractor 
or transfer, and four had no major subcontractors or transfers. Three of the four 
observations that had no proposed major subcontractors or transfers were for federally 
funded research and development center (FFRDC) services, which the Air Force awarded 
to non-profit contractors. 
  
                                                 
 25 We included transfers only if the prime contractor submitted a proposal or a discrete number of 
hours for that transfer. If the prime contractor multiplied any portion of their costs by a cost estimating 
relationship for their proposed transfer price, we did not include that transfer in our number of Major_Subs. 
 26 The Air Force did not award any of the contract actions in our sample prior to October 1, 2013; 
however, the increased threshold applied only to acquisitions started after October 1, 2013 (i.e., contract 
actions with an RFP Release Date after October 1, 2013). 
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Count 26  
Table 5. Major Subcontractor and Transfer Tabulation 
 
 
e. Aggressiveness of the Government’s Objective Position (Obj_Position)—
Continuous Variable 
This continuous variable identifies the percentage point change between the 
contractor’s total proposed dollar amount and AFNT’s total objective dollar amount:  
(Contractor total proposed dollar amount - AFNT total objective dollar amount) / 















We collected this data from the PPNM. The AFNT will know this value after 
evaluating the contractor’s proposal (end of Phase 2.0/start of Phase 3.0). 
We expect a positive relationship between Obj_Position and PALT. In general, a 
larger percentage point difference between the AFNT’s and contractor’s positions will 
shrink the zone of possible agreement and increase the length of negotiations (Phase 4.0).  
Table 6 contains the descriptive statistics of Obj_Position.  
Table 6. Objective Position Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
f. The Number of Times Delta Clearance is Required (Range)—Continuous 
Variable 
This continuous variable identifies the number of times the AFNT required a delta 
business clearance. The CAA approves a clearance value, which is the dollar amount that 
the AFNT must negotiate at or below to complete negotiations. If the AFNT and contractor 
do not agree to a price under the cleared amount, the AFNT must conduct a delta business 
clearance with the CAA to request a higher clearance amount (i.e., negotiation range or 
range). The preferred source of whether the AFNT required a higher range is “Tab 59 - 
Clearance Review & Approval Documentation” of the contract file; however, we did not 















used information from the “Business Clearance/Pre-Negotiation Authorization” paragraph 
in the PNM. The AFNT will not know this variable until the AFNT and contractor complete 
negotiations (end of Phase 4.0). 
We expect a positive relationship between Range and PALT. The AFNT and 
contractor may not agree to a price below the cleared amount for various reasons, such as 
changed requirements or no zone of possible agreement. Regardless of the reason, the 
AFNT regresses from Phase 4.0 to Phase 3.0 and must receive a higher clearance amount, 
which requires additional reviews and/or briefings. 
Table 7 and Table 8 contain the descriptive statistics and tabulation of Range. Of 
the 26 observations in the sample, 17 observations required at least one delta business 
clearance, and nine observations required zero delta business clearances. 

















Table 8. Range Tabulation 
 
 
g. Foreign Military Sales Requirement (FMS)—Categorical (Binary) 
Variable 
This categorical variable identifies whether the contract action includes Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) requirements (1) or not (0). The PPNM and PNM contain a 
“Description of Current Procurement: Program/Item/Service Identification” paragraph that 
identifies whether the contract action contained FMS requirements. The requirements 
document also indicates whether the requirement includes FMS requirements. The AFNT 
knows this variable prior to RFP release. Within our sample, 12 observations contained 
FMS requirements, and 14 did not contain FMS requirements. 
We expect a positive relationship between FMS and PALT based on analysis by 
AFMC/A9 and testimony from Claire Grady, former Director, DPAP. AFMC/A9 found 
that AFLCMC awarded 154 contracts, valued between $50 and $500 million, late, which 
means that the PALT exceeded AFLCMC’s standard PALT of 365 calendar days (V. Fry, 
personal communication, May 7, 2018). According to AFMC/A9, FMS requirements 
accounted for 61 contracts and 39 of the 154 contracts awarded late; AFLCMC awarded 
39 of 61 contracts for FMS requirements late; and the PALT exceeded more than 730 days 
for 23 of these FMS contracts. In her testimony before Congress, Grady stated that she was 
looking at ways to decrease the acquisition cycle-time of FMS and cited several areas of 
improvement including the requirements for certified cost or pricing data, use of UCAs, 
different contract types, and offset agreements (Assessing the DoD’s Execution of 
Responsibilities in the U.S. FMS Program, 2016). She explained that offsets are 









contractor would not incur in contracts without FMS requirements; that the DoD is not a 
party to these offset agreements; and that offsets are a significant source of delay. 
h. Non-Profit Contractor (Non_Profit)—Categorical (Binary) Variable 
This categorical variable identifies whether the contract awardee is a non-profit 
contractor (1) or not (0). The AFNT knows this variable prior to RFP release. Three 
observations are non-profit contractors, and 23 are not. We expect a negative relationship 
between Non_Profit and PALT because the AFNT and contractor do not need to negotiate 
profit or fee, which should decrease the proposal preparation, evaluation, and negotiation 
time. 
i. Program Executive Officer (PEO)—Categorical Variable 
This variable indicates the PEO portfolio that each individual contract action falls 
under, not the individual serving as the PEO. There are seven different PEO portfolios in 
our sample: Armament (EB), ISR (WI), Tanker (WK), Mobility (WL), PAR (WV), 
Fighters and Bombers (WW), and Non-PEO. The AFNT knows this variable prior to RFP 
release.  
WI, WK, and WV each contained one observation, and Non-PEO contained three 
observations within our sample. We grouped WI, WK, WV, and Non-PEO into one 
category, Other, due to the low number of observations within each of these PEOs. WL 
and WW contain seven observations each, and EB and Other contain six observations each. 
Table 9 shows the tabulation of PEO. 










We used deviation coding instead of dummy coding for PEO because deviation 
coding compares the outcomes of each individual group to the mean of all groups, rather 
than comparing each individual group to a specified level within the group (Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003). It is more useful for us to compare all four levels of PEO to the 
mean, rather than comparing Other, WL, and WW to EB. We also used unweighted effects, 
rather than weighted effects because the number of observations within each category are 
relatively similar. Table 10 shows the coding system for PEO. The Level of PEO column 
indicates the PEO responsible for the observation, and the EB, WL, and WW columns 
display the value for each respective variable within our regression model. For example, if 
the PEO responsible for a contract action is Other, then the values of the explanatory 
variables EB, WL, and WW, will each be -1. 
Table 10. PEO Deviation Coding 
 
 
We expect a relationship between PEO and PALT to exist, based on AFMC/A9’s 
analysis and variables other researchers used in their studies. AFMC/A9 identified that 
differences in the number and percentage of contracts awarded late exist between PEOs, 
but AFMC/A9 did not analyze the length of delays (V. Fry, personal communication, May 
7, 2018). The programs under each PEO also differ by technical complexity and program 
complexity. The number of critical technologies and testing required for programs differs 
by weapon system, such as armament versus fighters and bombers. 
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j. Previous Acquisition Data Available for Cost/Pricing Comparison 
(History)—Categorical (Binary) Variable 
This categorical variable identifies whether previous acquisition data was available 
to the AFNT in order to perform a meaningful cost or pricing comparison. There are two 
categories:  
• yes, the AFNT had previous acquisition data (1); or  
• no, the AFNT did not have previous acquisition data (0).  
We collected this data from the PPNM or PNM. The PPNM and PNM have a 
previous buy paragraph that describe similar purchases in the past and whether the AFNT 
can use data from those purchases for a cost or price comparison. The AFNT will know 
this value prior to RFP release. Within our sample, 17 observations have previous 
acquisition history that allows the AFNT to make a meaningful cost or price comparison 
with the current buy, and nine do not.  
We expect a negative relationship between History and PALT. Previous acquisition 
history provides data that the contractor can use to create bases of estimates and prepare 
proposals, data that the AFNT can use to evaluate proposals, and data that both sides can 
use in negotiations. 
A peculiarity in the data is that the PNMs of the three observations with the shortest 
timelines stated that the AFNT could not perform a meaningful price comparison with 
previous buys. These three observations were contract actions awarded to non-profit 
contractors for FFRDC requirements. 
3. Explanatory Variables Correlation Matrix 
Table 11 shows the correlation matrix for our response variable and explanatory 
variables and identifies the degree of multicollinearity between our explanatory variables. 
Multicollinearity becomes problematic when explanatory variables in a multiple regression 
model can linearly predict another explanatory variable accurately. Multicollinearity is a 
problem if the correlation value between explanatory variables is greater than 0.8 (Mason 
& Perreault, 1991). The highest absolute value of any of the correlations is 0.6286 and 
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between History and WL. Since the value is less than 0.8, multicollinearity is not 
problematic. 





C. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Equation 3 specifies our multiple linear regression model with each of the 
previously explained candidate explanatory variables. Ln(PALT) is the response variable. 
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 Ln(PALT) = β0 + β1Ln(Price) + β2(UCA) + β3(Adq_Prop) + β4(Major_Subs) + 
β5(Obj_Position) + β6(Range) + β7(FMS) + β8(Non_Profit) + β9(EB) + β10(WL) + 
β11(WW) + β12(History) + єi  (3) 
D. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
We used an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the model. An OLS 
estimation regression is commonly used to specify prediction models because OLS “seeks 
to minimize the sum of the squared differences between the observed and predicted squares 
of Y” (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 124).  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlines our research methodology. We summarize the population and 
sample data, detail our process of data collection, and explain our response and candidate 
explanatory variables in detail. We provide our preliminary regression model and 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Our research team uses an OLS regression to model the relationship between our 
response variable, PALT, and 12 explanatory variables using STATA 15 software. We 
used previous research and subject matter expertise to guide the development of our model. 
Given that heteroscedasticity can affect the validity or power of our statistical tests when 
using OLS regression, we employ heteroscedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors to 
reduce the effects of heteroscedasticity (Hayes & Cai, 2007).27 Table 12 shows the results 
of our regression model. The model (Equation 3) was significant (F (12, 13) = 33.44, p < 
.05), and the changes in the explanatory variables explained 95.19% of the variance in the 
response variable (R-squared = 0.9519). The adjusted R-squared = 0.9005 and is adjusted 
based on the number of explanatory variables used in our model. The β0 = 5.43 is the 
regression constant, or intercept, and represents the estimated Ln(PALT) of a hypothetical 
non-competitive contract action greater than $500 million with no influencing factors, that 
is, all Xi = 0 (β0 = 5.43, t(13) = 2.73, p = .017). The root-mean-square error28 (RMSE) of 
0.17 shows how accurately the model predicts the response variable. The full regression 
equation is  
 Ln(PALT) = β0 + β1Ln(Price) + β2(UCA) + β3(Adq_Prop) + β4(Major_Subs) + 
β5(Obj_Position) + β6(Range) + β7(FMS) + β8(Non_Profit) + β9(EB) + β10(WL) + 







                                                 
 27 The violation of the homoscedasticity assumption, also known as heteroscedasticity, assumes that 
the residual variances are not constant across all the explanatory variables in our model.  
 28 Defined in Appendix. 
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Table 12. Results of Regression Model 
 
 
In regression analysis, an explanatory variable is statistically significant when the 
p-value is less than alpha (α = significance level of 0.05). Alpha is the probability of a Type 
I error. A Type I error is an “error of rejecting the true null hypothesis or, less formally, 
finding things that are not there” (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 182). Our model estimated the 
effects—sign and magnitude—of 12 explanatory variables and five were statistically 
significant—UCA, Major_Subs, FMS, EB, and WW. We further discuss the effect of each 
explanatory variable in Chapter V.  





Ln(PALT) Coeff. Robust Std. Error t P>t
Price 0.0316 0.1000 0.32 0.756 -0.1837 0.2469
UCA 0.3341 0.1118 2.99 0.010 0.0926 0.5755
Adq_Prop
Y -0.0406 0.0926 0.926 0.668 -0.2407 0.1594
Major_Subs 0.0172 0.0069 0.007 0.028 0.0022 0.0322
Obj_Position -0.0004 0.0081 0.008 0.966 -0.0178 0.0171
Range 0.0477 0.033 0.033 0.173 -0.0237 0.1191
FMS
Y 0.4379 0.1509 2.9 0.012 0.1120 0.7638
Non_Profit
Y -0.6119 0.2867 -2.13 0.052 -1.2313 0.0075
EB -0.3322 0.0821 -4.05 0.001 -0.5096 -0.1549
WL 0.0908 0.0706 1.29 0.221 -0.0617 0.2433
WW 0.2341 0.0686 3.41 0.005 0.0859 0.3822
History
Y 0.1047 0.0902 1.16 0.266 -0.0901 0.2997








1. Chow Test  
The Chow Test determines whether “subsets of coefficients in two regressions are 
equal [or not]” (Chow, 1960, p. 591). We used the Chow Test to determine whether our 
predictor variables have different effects on different subgroups of our sample: contract 
actions with and contract actions without FMS requirements. If the effects are different, 
we should separate contract actions with and without FMS requirements into two different 
populations. If the effects are not different, we may include the two subgroups in the same 
population. The null hypothesis is that our predictor variables have the same effects on the 
different subgroups within our sample. Equation 4 is the Chow Test equation. 
 Chow = (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃−(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1−𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2))/𝑘𝑘)
(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1+𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅2)/(𝑁𝑁1+𝑁𝑁2−2𝑘𝑘)
, where (4) 
P: Pooled group (Group 1 + Group 2) 
[Group] 1: contract actions without FMS requirements 
[Group] 2: Contract actions with FMS requirements 
RSSP = 0.3845 (Used RSS from non-robust estimator model) 
RSS1 = 0.1277 
RSS2 = 0.0454 
K: Number of predictor variables in pooled group = 12 
N1: Number of observations in Group 1 = 14 
N2: Number of observations in Group 2 = 12 
Chow test statistic = 0.2910 
F-critical (.05, 12, 2) = 19.4125 
Since the Chow test statistic is less than the F-critical and does not fall in the 
rejection region, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, which means that there is no evidence 
that the predictor variables have different impacts on different subgroups within our 
sample. Thus, we do not need to separate these two subgroups into different populations 
and we can keep sole-source acquisitions with and without FMS requirements in the same 
population. 
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2. Breusch-Pagan Test  
The OLS assumption of homoscedasticity states that the variance in the error term 
is constant; and the violation of homoscedasticity is known as heteroscedasticity. The 
Breusch-Pagan Test detects any linear form of heteroscedasticity by testing the null 
hypothesis to determine whether error variances are equal. Cohen et. al. (2003) stated that 
the “failure of homoscedasticity assumption may not be serious enough to invalidate tests 
of statistical significance, but it still could invalidate actual prediction if based on the 
assumption of equal error throughout the distribution” (p. 96). Therefore, it is important to 
address heteroscedasticity because it biases the standard errors, which leads to biases in 
test statistics and confidence intervals (CI). Figure 4 shows a plot of the residuals against 
the fitted values. The residual-versus-fitted plot shows an uneven distribution, which 
necessitates a formal test for heteroscedasticity in STATA.  
The Breusch-Pagan Test resulted in a chi-square of 3.50 indicating that 
heteroscedasticity was present (chi2 (1) = 3.50; Prob > chi2 = 0.0613). A large chi-square 
indicates that heteroscedasticity is present. We use heteroscedasticity-consistent (robust) 
standard error estimators to reduce the effects of heteroscedasticity, thereby addressing the 
violation of the OLS assumption that standard errors are identically distributed.  
 
 Residuals versus Fitted Plot 
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V. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results of our regression model and 
their interpretations. First, we present and analyze the results of the five statistically 
significant explanatory variables. Next, we discuss the explanatory variables that we 
hypothesized affected PALT but were not statistically significant. We also explain the 
methods of hypothesis testing (i.e., Type I and Type II error) and the explanatory power as 
it pertains to our regression model. Lastly, we discuss why our results are meaningful.  
A. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
1. Interpretation of Statistically Significant Explanatory Variables 
In specifying the regression model, we used 12 explanatory variables to predict 
PALT. Five of the 12 explanatory variables were statistically significant, which confirms 
that a relationship between the explanatory variable and the response variable exists. We 
can also conclude, with 95% confidence, the lower and upper limit of how small and how 
large the effect size of the population might be in estimating PALT. The sign and 
magnitude of each effect is given by its beta coefficient, βi. Each of the beta coefficients 
indicates an effect of the explanatory variables while holding all other explanatory 
variables in the equation constant. We discuss and analyze each statistically significant 
explanatory variable in the following paragraphs. 
a. Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA)—Categorical (Binary) Variable 
The explanatory variable, UCA, is statistically significant, where β2 = 0.3341 is the 
estimated regression coefficient for UCA, such that a contract action determined to be a 
UCA is associated with a 33.41% increase in PALT (β2 = 0.3341, t(13) = 2.99, p = .010). 
As expected, UCA is positively related to PALT; and based on this model, we are 95% 
confident that the percentage increase in PALT is between 9.26% and 57.55%. This result 
supports the claims in literature that the difficulties in definitizing UCAs indeed increase 
PALT.  
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b. Number of Proposed Major Subcontractors and Major Inter/Intra-Work 
Transfer Orders/Agreements (Major_Subs)—Continuous Variable 
The explanatory variable, Major_Subs, is statistically significant, where β4 = 
0.0172 is the estimated regression coefficient for Major_Subs, such that each additional 
major subcontractor is associated with a 1.72% increase in PALT (β4 = 0.0172, t(13) = 
0.007, p = .028). As expected, Major_Subs is positively related to PALT; and based on this 
model, we are 95% confident that the percentage increase in PALT is between 0.22% and 
3.22%.  
c. FMS Foreign Military Sales Requirement (FMS)—Categorical (Binary) 
Variable  
The explanatory variable, FMS, is statistically significant, where β7 = 0.4379 is the 
estimated regression coefficient for FMS, such that a contract action determined to be an 
FMS requirement is associated with a 43.79% increase in PALT (β7 = 0.4379, t(13) = 2.9, 
p = .012). As expected, FMS, is positively related to PALT; and based on this model, we 
are 95% confident that the percentage increase in PALT is between 11.20% and 76.38%.  
d. Armament (EB)—Categorical Variable  
The explanatory variable, EB, is statistically significant, where β9 = -0.3322 is the 
estimated regression coefficient for EB, such that a contract action categorized as EB is 
associated with a 33.22% decrease in PALT (β9 = -0.3322, t(13) = -4.05, p = .001). As 
expected, EB, is negatively related to PALT, and based on this model, we are 95% 
confident that the percentage decrease in PALT is between -50.96% and -15.49%.  
e. Fighters and Bombers (WW)—Categorical Variable  
The explanatory variable, WW, is statistically significant, where β12 = 0.2341 is the 
estimated regression coefficient for WW, such that a contract action categorized as WW is 
associated with a 23.41% increase in PALT (β12 = 0.2341, t(13) = 3.41, p = .005). As 
expected, WW, is positively related to PALT; and based on this model, we are 95% 
confident that the percentage decrease in PALT is between 8.59% and 38.22%.  
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2. Interpretation of Nonsignificant Explanatory Variables 
Our study has a small sample size of 26 observations, and we include 12 
explanatory variables in our model. Cohen et al. (2003) stated that “the greater the number 
of [explanatory variables], the lower the power of the test on each [explanatory variable]” 
(p. 186). When the statistical power of a study is low, there is a reduced chance of detecting 
an explanatory variable’s true effect, making it difficult to derive a meaningful and accurate 
interpretation of the explanatory variable. Drawing statistical inferences on an explanatory 
variable may result in a Type I or Type II error. A Type I error is an “error of rejecting the 
true null hypothesis or, less formally, finding things that are not there” and a Type II error 
is an “error of failing to reject a false null hypothesis and failing to find things that are 
there” (Cohen et al., 2003, pp. 182–183). If an explanatory variable is nonsignificant, then 
our sample data provides no evidence that the effect of the explanatory variable on PALT 
is different from zero in the population. We discuss and analyze each statistically 
nonsignificant explanatory variable with the understanding that our data does not 
substantiate a statistically significant relationship, even though one may exist.  
a. Proposed Price (Price)—Continuous Variable 
The explanatory variable, Price, where β1 = 0.0316 is the estimated regression 
coefficient (β1 = 0.0316, t(13) = 0.32, p = .756), was in the expected positive direction in 
relation to PALT. However, our data offered no support for this relationship.  
b. Is the Date of Initial Proposal and Date of Adequate Proposal the Same 
(Adq_Prop)—Categorical (Binary) Variable 
The explanatory variable, Adq_Prop, where β2= -0.0406 is the estimated regression 
coefficient (β2 = -0.0406, t(13) = 0.926, p = .668), was in the expected negative direction. 
We hypothesized that PALT would decrease if the initial proposal and adequate proposal 
date were the same, but our data does not substantiate this relationship.  
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c. Aggressiveness of the Government’s Objective Position (Obj_Position)—
Continuous Variable 
The explanatory variable, Obj_Position, where β5 = -0.0004 is the estimated 
regression coefficient (β5 = -0.0004, t(13) = 0.008, p = .966), had an estimated effect 
opposite of our hypothesis. We hypothesized that a larger percentage point difference 
between the AFNT and contractor positions would increase the length of negotiations, 
thereby increasing PALT.  
d. The Number of Times Delta Clearance is Required (Range)—Continuous 
Variable  
The explanatory variable, Range, where β6 = 0.0477 is the estimated regression 
coefficient (β6 = 0.0477, t(13) = 0.033, p = .173), was in the expected positive direction in 
relation to PALT. However, our data offered no support that PALT would increase.  
e. Non-Profit Contractor (Non_Profit)—Categorical (Binary) Variable 
The explanatory variable, Non_Profit, where β8 = -0.6119 is the estimated 
regression coefficient (β8 = -0.6119, t(13) = -2.13, p = .052), was in the expected negative 
direction in relation to PALT. However, our data offered no support that PALT would 
decrease.  
f. Mobility (WL)—Categorical Variable  
The explanatory variable, WL, where β8 = -0.6119 is the estimated regression 
coefficient (β10 = 0.0908, t(13) = -2.13, p = .052), was in the positive direction in relation 
to PALT. We did not have a specific hypothesis for WL and wanted to test its effect on 
PALT.  
g. Previous Acquisition Data Available for Cost/Pricing Comparison 
(History)—Categorical (Binary) Variable  
The explanatory variable, History, where β12 = 0.1047 is the estimated regression 
coefficient (β12 = 0.1047, t(13) = 1.16, p = .266), had an estimated effect opposite of our 
hypothesis. We hypothesized that the availability of previous acquisition history would 
decrease PALT.  
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3. Why Results Are Meaningful 
The coefficient of determination, also known as R-squared, is the percent of 
variance explained by our model. The value of R-squared ranges from 0% to 100%, and 
the model is interpreted as a “perfect fit” at 100%. Cohen et al. (2003) states that a “value 
of R-squared closer to [100%] generally implies a ‘good’ model” (p. 85). The value of the 
adjusted R-squared (adjusted R-squared = 90.05%) corrects for the sample size and the 
total number of factors estimated in our model. According to Cohen et al. (2003), our model 
would be considered a “good” model when compared against the baseline (i.e., the 
average). Therefore, we can rely on our model—its data, results, and analysis—to provide 
valuable insight on factors that affect PALT.  
Our model provided objective measures of relationships between our response 
variable and explanatory variables. Instead of relying on experience and intuition, we have 
data that informs us (1) if a factor affects PALT and (2) if so, by how much. With this 
information and knowledge, acquisition leaders, commanders, and decision makers can 
improve business decisions and management trends in order to “deliver on a timely basis 
the best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and 
fulfilling public policy objectives” (FAR 1.102(a)). While immediate changes are never 
guaranteed, key stakeholders can now ask themselves, “What actions can we take with this 
data?” and “What can we do better and how?”  
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VI. LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we discuss the limitations of our study, provide recommendations 
for further research, and answer our research questions.  
A. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The primary limitation of our research was the availability and amount of data on 
sole-source acquisitions greater than $500 million—our data set was limited to only 26 
observations. We exercised our judgment, with the aid of our advisors, on specifying a 
model that could substantiate our results given a small sample size.  
In specifying our model, we had to limit the number of explanatory variables based 
on our sample size. Even though our team brainstormed over 30 explanatory variables that 
we thought could have a significant impact on PALT, mathematically, we could not include 
more predictors than observations. Some of these factors required proxies that were 
difficult to quantify and measure, such as the level of expertise on the technical evaluation 
team. Consequently, our team was unable to determine user-friendly and easily measurable 
metrics for these factors making them unusable until we find an appropriate proxy.  
Another limitation of a small sample size is that it decreases the estimation’s level 
of certainty. Small sample sizes often result in broader CIs, which are not as precise 
compared to a larger sample size. A broader CI is more likely to include zero, increasing 
the risk for insignificant beta coefficients. Furthermore, we were unable to externally 
validate our model against a population such as the Space and Missiles Systems Center 
(SMC), the different military branches, and the DoD. Ultimately, we need a larger pool of 
observations to validate or refine our model.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Based on our research and our limitations discussed above, we have several 
recommendations for further research. First, we recommend additional research to 
externally validate the model to the population or refine the model. This includes creating 
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a validation pool from the population as defined in Chapter III and testing the model within 
that pool. From there, based on the results of the test, the model would be strengthened or 
could be adjusted. 
Additionally, further external validity could be proven by creating a validation pool 
including acquisitions greater than $500 million from organizations outside of AFLCMC, 
such as SMC. Once the validation pool has been created and the model tested against it, 
depending on the results, we would recommend adjusting and re-testing the model, thus 
strengthening the results through widening the population and subsequently, the sample 
size. We would also recommend including acquisitions from sister services across the DoD 
into the population and sample data set, and following similar research as discussed above 
to ensure external validity and future utilization of the model in these different 
organizations. 
Another area of research is estimating the number of days in each phase of the 
contract award process. Phases 1.0 (Release of RFP to Receipt of Adequate Proposal) and 
2.0 (Fact Finding and Evaluation) accounted for nearly two-thirds of the entire PALT in 
our sample. Understanding the significant factors that affect these two phases and those 
factors' effects will help AFLCMC/PK identify management focus areas to decrease the 
PALT of their acquisitions. 
Our research primarily focused on the process of the buyer, or government, side of 
an acquisition. Future researchers can investigate the seller, or contractor, side of the 
acquisition and the interaction between the two sides. The seller is responsible for the 
deliverable in Phase 1.0 and this phase takes longer than any other phase, on average. 
Taking steps to decrease the time that Phase 1.0 takes can significantly decrease the PALT. 
Last, we recommend that future researchers study the effects of both human factors 
and technical risk and maturation factors, as discussed in Chapter II, on PALT. Human 
factors include areas such as the experience of the AFNT and their capacities, the turnover 
rate of key personnel on the negotiations team, and potential political influences on the 
acquisition. Technical risk and maturation factors could be such things a projected post-
award schedule that does not account for the time required for technology to keep up with 
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the development of the weapon system. It is difficult to find appropriate proxies that 
represent these factors well, and it is harder to assume linear relationships between these 
factors and timelines, thus it is difficult to include them in regression analysis. Regardless 
of this difficulty, our team sees the importance of the inclusion of these factors in literature 
and therefore recommends this further research. 
C. CONCLUSION 
From our research, we found that the primary contextual factors that influence 
PALT are UCA, Major_Subs, FMS, EB, and WW. Each of these factors were statistically 
significant and affected PALT in the direction we hypothesized. The resulting beta 
coefficients (i.e., magnitude) for these five factors made sense based on subject matter 
expertise, experience, and literature.  
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APPENDIX.  DEFINITIONS 
Acquisition: “the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services 
(including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase 
or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, 
developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency 
needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency 
needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, 
contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management 
functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract” (FAR 
2.101, 2018). 
 
Business clearance: “for competitive acquisitions, approval to issue the solicitation. For 
noncompetitive contract actions, approval to begin negotiations” (AFFARS 
5301.9000(c), 2018). 
 
Contract: “a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the 
supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for them. It includes all 
types of commitments that obligate the Government to an expenditure of appropriated 
funds and that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing. In addition to bilateral 
instruments, contracts include (but are not limited to) awards and notices of awards; job 
orders or task letters issued under basic ordering agreements; letter contracts; orders, such 
as purchase orders, under which the contract becomes effective by written acceptance or 
performance; and bilateral contract modifications. Contracts do not include grants and 
cooperative agreements covered by 31 U.S.C. 6301, et seq” (FAR 2.101, 2018). 
 
Contract clearance: “for noncompetitive contract actions, approval by the clearance 
approval authority to award a contract or contract modification/contract action” 
(AFFARS 5301.9000(e)(3), 2018). 
 
Contracting officer: “a person with the authority to enter into, administer, and/or 
terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings. The term includes 
certain authorized representatives of the contracting officer acting within the limits of 
their authority as delegated by the contracting officer. ‘Administrative contracting officer 
(ACO)’ refers to a contracting officer who is administering contracts. ‘Termination 
contracting officer (TCO)’ refers to a contracting officer who is settling terminated 
contracts. A single contracting officer may be responsible for duties in any or all of these 
areas” (FAR 2.101, 2018). 
 
Definitization: “the agreement on, or determination of, contract terms, specifications, 
and price, which converts the undefinitized contract action to a definitive contract” 
(DFARS 217.7401(c), 2018). 
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Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs): “activities that are 
sponsored under a broad charter by a Government agency (or agencies) for the purpose of 
performing, analyzing, integrating, supporting, and/or managing basic or applied research 
and/or development, and that receive 70 percent or more of their financial support from 
the Government; and— 
(1) A long-term relationship is contemplated; 
(2) Most or all of the facilities are owned or funded by the Government; and 
(3) The FFRDC has access to Government and supplier data, employees, and 
facilities beyond that common in a normal contractual relationship” (FAR 2.101, 2018). 
 
Milestone I: “the start of the demonstration and validation phase. This marks the 
beginning of the period where contractor(s) and the service management office prepare 
designs and perform hardware testing in preparation for full development” (Drezner & 
Smith, 1990, p. 8). 
 
Qualifying proposal: “a proposal containing sufficient data for the DoD to do complete 
and meaningful analyses and audits of the— 
(1) Data in the proposal; and 
(2) Any other data that the contracting officer has determined DoD needs to 
review in connection with the contract” (DFARS 217.7401(c), 2018). 
 
Risk Reduction Decision: also called Milestone A by DoD, “is an investment decision to 
pursue specific product or design concepts, and to commit the resources required to 
mature technology and/or reduce any risks that must be mitigated prior to decisions 
committing the resources needed for development leading to production and fielding” 
(DoD, 2017). 
 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE): the standard deviation of the regression and a lower 
value of RMSE indicates better fit. 
 
Selected Acquisition Report: “provides the status of total program cost, schedule, and 
performance to Congress; provides program unit cost and unit cost breach information for 
a specific program” (DoD, 2017). 
 
Senior Center Contracting Official (SCCO): “an individual serving in the position of 
Director of Contracting within AFMC (to include AFICA/CC) and at SMC who reports 
directly to the Center Commander. SCCO duties and responsibilities may also be 
performed by the Deputy Director of Contracting, Assistant Director of Contracting, the 
Technical Director/Assistant to the Director of Contracting, and the AFICA Executive 
Director, as well as the Director of Contracting at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Hanscom 
AFB, Hill AFB, and Robins AFB and the Deputy Director of Contracting, Assistant 
Director of Contracting, and the Technical Director/Assistant to the Director of 




Sole-source acquisition: “a contract for the purchase of supplies or services that is 
entered into or proposed to be entered into by an agency after soliciting and negotiating 
with only one source” (FAR 2.101, 2018). 
 
Solicitation: “any request to submit offers or quotations to the Government. Solicitations 
under sealed bid procedures are called ‘invitations for bids.’ Solicitations under 
negotiated procedures are called ‘requests for proposals.’ Solicitations under simplified 
acquisition procedures may require submission of either a quotation or an offer” (FAR 
2.101, 2018).  
 
Undefinitized contract action: “any contract action for which the contract terms, 
specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action. 
Examples are letter contracts, orders under basic ordering agreements, and provisioned 
item orders, for which the price has not been agreed upon before performance has begun. 
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